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The evolution of Brouwer's ideas on logic throughout his entire scientific life is practically 
unknown. Still, the study of this evolution is important, on the one hand, for grasping how 
Brouwer's notion of intuitionism allowed for the construction of logical systems and, on the 
other, in order to see how some statements of intuitionistic logic which are now considered 
obvious were only formulated in their correct form after much rethinking. In this paper, we 
will thus consider Brouwer's ideas on logic in general as well as some laws in particular while 
tracing their development (i.e., the laws of excluded middle, testability, and reciprocity of 
complementarity). © 1995 Academic Press, Inc. 
Die Entwicklung von Brouwers Auffassungen tiber Logik wahrend seines Lebens ist nahezu 
unbekannt. Die Analyse dieser Entwicklung ist sehr wichtig, weil sie zeigt, erstens dab Brou- 
wers Intuitionismus die Grundlage ftir die Konstruktion eines logischen Systems abgeben 
konnte; zweitens dab einige S~tze der intuitionistischen Logik, die heute als selbstverst~ndlich 
angesehen werden, erst nach einem langen ProzeB von Uberlegungen korrekt formuliert 
werden konnten. Deshalb wird in diesem Aufsatz Brouwers Auffassung tiber Logik im allge- 
meinen und tiber einige logische S~itze (d.h. den Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten, den von 
der Alternative von Absurdit~it oder Absurditat der Absurdit~it, und den vonder  Reziprozit~it 
der Komplementarit~it) im besonderen betrachten und ihre Entwicklung umrissen. © 1995 
Academic Press, Inc. 
L'evoluzione delle idee di Brouwer sulla logica durante tutta la sua vita scientifica b pratica- 
mente sconosciuta. Tuttavia, lo studio di questa evoluzione ~ importante, da un lato per 
comprendere come il concetto di intuizionismo di Brouwer conteneva gi~ in s6 le basi per la 
costruzione di un sistema logico, d'altro lato per vedere come asserti della logica intuizionista, 
che sono ora considerati ovvi, furono formulati correttamente solo dopo molti ripensamenti. 
In questo articolo considereremo le idee di Brouwer sulla logica in generale su alcune leggi 
in particolare (la legge del terzo escluso, di provabilit~k di reciprocith della complementaritY), 
delineandone l'evoluzione. © 1995 Academic Press, Inc. 
AMS subject classifications: 03-03, 01A60,03F55. 
KEy WORDS: History of mathematics, 20th century, foundations of mathematics, intuitionism, symbolic 
logic, logical laws. 
1. INTRODUCTION: FROM MYSTICISM TO LOGIC 
Brouwer's definition of intuitionistic logic arose from his definition of mathemat- 
ics. He had sensed the need to redefine mathematics owing to a Weltanschauung 
which he first presented in his pamphlet, Leven, kunst en mystiek [3] of 1905 and later 
inserted--insofar as his supervisor, Diederik Johannes Korteweg I permitted--in his 
1 Brouwer conceived of a dissertation i  which his Weltanschauung was very dominant. Korteweg, 
however, forced him to edit out most of his philosophical remarks ince the dissertation was in mathemat- 
ics. For the details of this difference of opinion, see [17; 19; 40]. 
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dissertation Over de grondslagen der wiskunde [4] of 1907. The pamphlet, written 
in reaction to the Hegelian Gerard Bolland (who exerted a sort of cultural domina- 
tion at the time) [21, 4], turned on a mystical view of the world: it quoted extensively 
from Boehme, Meister Eckhart, and the Bhagavad-Gita. The main concept was 
that only man's inner self can reach happiness. Therefore, all attempts to move 
towards the outer world had to be condemned as sources of pain for man. Among 
these attempts, Brouwer included: 
(1) (initially) space-t ime perception (which, from 1907 on, he categorized 
merely as time percept ion)- -namely,  our first contact with the outer world; 
(2) science, since it is a form of domination over nature; and 
(3) language, since it is a form of domination over other men. 
Language serves as a means of communication, and all forms of communication 
aim to convince others, to change the mind of others. 2 The communication of a 
concept hus involves making another person build a mental construction 3 similar 
to one's own [40, 397, line 4.35]. For Brouwer, mathematics was both a science 
(because of its applicability) and a language (because it is a calculus), and as such 
it had to be condemned. It was thus necessary to work out a new definition of 
mathematics that made it acceptable from this ethical point of view. Since mathemat- 
ics could not have anything to do with the outer world, it had first to be a languageless 
mental activity without any aim of application. It had to pass from one piece of 
evidence to the next, and therefore did not need any rules; it was only required 
"to see," "to take note." 
As for logic, in 1905 Brouwer simply affirmed that relative to "logic and mathe- 
matics (a sharp distinction between them is hardly possible)" [3, 6], while by 1907 
he had refined his analysis [4, 73-111]. Brouwer started with the definition of logic 
as a set of laws of thought [4, 70]. Then, he observed (as we shall see in Section 
3) that Aristotelian logic is a part of mathematics, the special kind of mathematical 
thought obtained if one restricts oneself to relations of whole and part [4, 71]. 
Therefore, he had to specify in which sense the principles of logic can be considered 
"laws" because within the intuitionistic framework mathematical thought did not 
follow any rules, and, hence, " law" could no longer mean "rule." This implied that 
a law could not be a source of truth; it could only be linguistic in nature. Considered 
as something linguistic, a law can only be the recording of the regularities present in 
2 It is worthwhile to note that this conception of language was the core of the "Signific Movement," 
which was founded in Great Britain at the end of nineteenth century by Lady Victoria Welby and which 
later spread toHolland through Frederik van Eeden. That movement emphasized the characteristic of 
persuasiveness of language and aimed for a social renewal through changes in language (new words 
should produce n w social orientation). Brouwer's teacher, Gerrit Mannoury, as well as Brouwer himself 
was an adherent of the Signific Movement. For a detailed account of Brouwer's envolvement in the 
movement, see [42]. 
3 The precise terminology was that language "evokes in the listener a mathematical system identical 
with that of the speaker." The expression "mental construction," which was then becoming a common- 
place in intuitionistic literature, appeared in [11,477]. 
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some expressions. Thus, Aristotelian logic is the set of recordings of the regularities 
present in the expressions of a special kind of mathematical thought, while logistic 
is the set of recordings of the regularities present in the expressions ofall mathemati- 
cal thought. 
2. THE WEAKNESS OF LOGIC 
The linguistic nature of logic is the source of a series of weaknesses. First, all 
kinds of expressions depend on the particular language used. So, the regularities 
which can be found in a set of expressions are related to the specific language used. 
Consequently, logic is not something which is absolutely and eternally valid; it is 
not the same for all men for all time throughout the world. Rather, it is linked to 
the particular language used to express thoughts and therefore to a particular culture 
[4, 74]. 4 Finally, since logic is linguistic, it suffers from the same defect of all 
languages: it cannot give any assurance as to the positive achievement of its aim. 
In other words, like all languages, logic seeks to communicate and in such a way that 
the addressee builds a particular mental construct. Since this involves persuasion, 
however, it also depends on the will of the addressee. Therefore, no language, 
including logic, can guarantee results. Moreover, symbolic language is, in fact, the 
worst language that one could adopt. Due to its "coldness," it has the least chance 
of achieving persuasion. This view is diametrically opposed to that of Frege, for 
whom logic was the set of rules for finding new theorems, and its certainty was 
guaranteed by the use of a "neutral" language, one deprived of emotional connota- 
tions, which excluded interference from tacit presuppositions, conventions, or be- 
liefs. Roughly speaking, Frege preferred a symbolic language for logic since the 
latter had to prove theorems and therefore control all aspects of the various steps. 
Brouwer, on the contrary, disliked the idea of a symbolic language for logic (and 
for language in general) because, as a language, it itself aims to persuade and hence 
needs emotive force. 
There are also further reasons for Brouwer's dislike of symbolic language. First, 
he had a sort of personal aversion to it, as evidenced in his more technical (topologi- 
cal) works in which he avoided symbolism [22, 24-25]. Second, symbolic language 
was strictly linked to formalism, the foundational school which Brouwer very 
strongly opposed. Third, symbolic language draws ttention more to the formal 
aspect han to the content of mathematics. Finally, like all new languages, ymbolic 
language has to be learned and so presents a further obstacle to successful communi- 
cation [39, 156]. 
All of this followed from Brouwer's definition of logic, which nevertheless allowed 
the construction of a symbolic logical system provided that it was not considered 
complete. In other words, logic as a pure manipulation of symbols can be positively 
4 The influence of Gerrit Mannoury can be seen here. He believed that mathematics was a linguistic 
system which develops according to conventional laws depending on the society that produces them 
(see [27, 258-259]). Brouwer did not accept he linguistic character of mathematics, but rather the 
dependence of the logical anguage on the culture in which it was born. 
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judged from Brouwer's  mystical standpoint. As long as it is not applied and remains 
something done for its own sake, it represents a source of beauty, a pleasure which 
originates from pure contemplation. Brouwer realized and articulated this in a talk 
on the algebra of logic given at the end of his scientific career. He acknowledged 
the "merits" of classical algebra "quite apart from the question of its applicability 
to mathematics" and consequently also the merits of "its successor," symbolic logic, 
because it is "a thing of exceptional harmony and beauty"  and "is for a great part 
cultivated for its own sake" [15, 554]. In mentioning applicability here, Brouwer 
alluded to the fact that some of the laws of logic no longer hold, in particular the 
law of excluded middle to which we now turn. 
3. THE LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE 
As ment ioned above, Brouwer expressed a cautious openness to logic during the 
last years of his life. Prior to that, however, he had encouraged Heyting in his 
construction of an intuitionistic logic presented in [28],5 while he himself had shown 
very little interest in logical calculi. In his writings, he ment ioned Russell's system 
only in his 1907 doctoral thesis [4] and analyzed De Morgan's  ystem in his last 
paper in 1955 [15]. When he wrote his thesis, he was convinced that logic was an 
irrelevant part of mathematics, since logic was a collection of banalities which 
anyone can assert. For him, the substantial core of the mathematical  enterprise lay 
in the realm of extraordinary invention which only a genius can produce. He 
expressed this in correspondence with his supervisor, Korteweg [41, 503-504], as 
a further elaboration upon what he had already stated in the draft and final version 
of his thesis. There, he had first affirmed that "intuitive logical reasoning is that 
special kind of mathematical  reasoning which remains if, considering mathematical  
structures, one restricts oneself to relations of whole and part; the mathematical 
structures themselves are in no respect especially elementary, so that they do not 
justify any priority of logical reasoning over ordinary mathematical  reasoning" [4, 
73]. He went on to assert that "the usual language of mathematics in general is 
5 Heyting had been stimulated to elaborate an intuitionistic formal system by a question formulated by 
Mannoury for a competition organized by the Wiskundige Genootschap (the Amsterdam Mathematical 
Society) in 1927 [45, 165]. Heyting elaborated his logical system after having examined those ofRuss ll 
and Whitehead, sent in his essay on the subject, and won the prize. Brouwer's well-known dislike for 
symbolic language could give rise to the assumption that Brouwer did not appreciate this work of 
Heyting, but, as Troelstra [44, 16-17; 47, 11] and Schmitz [38, 14-16] remark, there are some reasons 
for believing that this interpretation of the Heyting-Brouwer relationship is false. In the first place, 
there is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting on his intuitionistic calculus dated 17.07.1928: "Your manuscript 
interested me extraordinarily, and I regret that now I have to return it in a hurry .... I have learned 
to appreciate your work so much that I would like to ask you to rework and rewrite it in German 
(preferably with more details, instead of less)." In a letter from Brouwer to T. de Donder dated 
09.10.1930, Brouwer admitted that: "En preparant une note sur l'intuitionisme pour le Bulletin de 
l'Acad~mie Royale d Belgique, je fus agr6ablement surpris d'envoir paraitre une de mon 61~ve M. 
Heyting 61ucidant d'une mani6re magistrale les points que j'avais voulu mettre en lu i~ moi-m6me. 
... J'examinerai si ~ la note de M. Heyting il reste h ajouter quelque chose qui puisse approfondir les 
notions g6n6rales sur la logique intuitionniste." Finally, there is the fact that Brouwer himself proposed 
the publication of Heyting's work in the Mathematische Annalen. See [26, 160-161]. 
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imbued with that of logical reasoning. However, this fact is due only to the centuries- 
old tradition of logical terms in language, in connection with its limited vocabulary.' ,6 
He hasted to add that "Man, inclined to take a mathematical view of everything, 
had also applied this bias to mathematical language, and in former centuries exclu- 
sively to the language of logical reasoning: the science arising from this activity is 
theoretical logic. It is only in the last twenty years (though the earliest traces go 
back to Leibnitz) that people have started looking in the same way at mathematical 
language in general: this is the content of logistic" [4, 74]. Brouwer had also stated 
that the law of syllogism corresponds to "the very simplest form of mathematical 
reasoning, namely passing by a tautology from one relation to another" [4, 74], 
and that "while in the syllogism a mathematical e ement could be discerned, the 
proposition 'a function is either differentiable or not differentiable' says nothing; 
it expresses the same as the following 'if a function is not differentiable, then it is 
not differentiable"' [4, 75]. This led him immediately to specify that "the syllogism 
and the other logical principles may be reckoned to hold for the language of logical 
reasonings on finite sets, on denumerably infinite sets, on domains in continua, but 
in any case exclusively on mathematically constructed systems; the conviction that 
we may rely on that applicability, is based on the certainty that mathematically 
constructed systems are under discussion" [4, 75]. Finally, he declared that "we 
safely apply the principles of identity, syllogism, distribution, contradiction and ter- 
tium non datur" [4, 88]. 
In the year following his thesis, Brouwer reflected further on this problem. So 
far nothing has been published that can testify to the development of his ideas. 
Summarizing the position he put forth in his thesis, we note that, first, he affirmed 
that logic expresses a kind of mathematical reasoning; second, he stated that both 
the law of identity and the law of excluded middle express nothing; third, he 
underlined the fact that a logical law must always refer to a constructed mathematical 
system; but finally he declared that all classical laws hold. This produced an inconsis- 
tency of which, we may suppose, Brouwer became aware, yet we have only the 
results of his reflections. In [4, 108], he affirmed that logical laws are true only if 
they express a certain mathematical content. He realized that a logical law must 
first signify a potential piece of evidence, refer to some mental construction, before 
one can check if the mental construction has the properties hypothesized and so 
determine if it is true. From this perspective, all logical constants must be interpreted 
as referring to a specific kind of construction. Although Brouwer was aware of 
this necessity, he never studied all logical constants in a systematic way; he only 
reinterpreted them when he "met them" in logical laws in various contexts. This 
6 AS for the links between logic and the language which is typical of Western culture, Dirk van Dalen 
[24, 40] recalls that Brouwer, in a letter to Korteweg (where he discussed his dissertation), objected to 
logic not only on theoretical grounds (i.e., in the sensthat there are no logical but only mathematical 
reasonings) but also on emotional grounds. Van Dalen quotes Brouwer as writing: "Theoretical logic 
does not teach anything in the present world ... it only serves lawyers and popular leaders not to 
instruct the others, but to deceive them .... I believe that there may not be an abuse more firmly 
entrenched than that which is coalesced with the most popular p rt of language." 
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was the reason he had to reconsider  the same subject several  t imes. He  did not 
work  out a system of logic with its axioms and rules. He  just cons idered single 
tradit ional  aws, re interpreted them in terms of menta l  constructions, and, if the 
meaning seemed untenable,  looked for concrete counterexamples.  
The first and main law which he considered was that of excluded middle.  Brouwer  
presented the new interpretat ion of the law directly, without first specifying the 
new meaning of each logical constant present  in it: " I t  claims that every supposit ion 
is e i ther true or false; in mathemat ics  this means that for every supposed imbedding 
of a system into another,  7 satisfying certain given condit ions, we can either accom- 
plish such an imbedding by a construct ion or we can arr ive by a construct ion at 
the arrestment  of the process which would lead to the imbedd ing"  [4, 109]. Thus, 
it can be argued that a dis junction is true if e i ther we can per form the construct ion 
expressed by its first member  or we can per form the construct ion expressed by the 
other  member .  It is also possible to interpret  negat ion - - that  is, the construct ion 
which negat ion expresses - - in  this way; negat ion involves a construct ion that fails 
its aim or, better ,  a construct ion that can no longer go on. In [4, 73], Brouwer  had 
emphasized that this was what was commonly  meant  by absurdity,  a construct ion 
which leads to a contradict ion.  Therefore,  when he later ( from 1923 on) expounded 
the meaning of negat ion himself, he spoke about  construct ions that lead to an ab- 
surdity. 8
Af ter  present ing the new meaning of the law of excluded middle,  Brouwer  judged 
it for validity. In order  to grasp the quest ion fully, note that Brouwer  had in mind 
and quoted H i lber t ' s  1900 paper  [35] to the Internat ional  Congress of Mathemat ics ,  
in which he considered open prob lems for the new century and, in general ,  the status 
of "prob lem"  in mathematics.  The latter served as Brouwer 's  po int  of departure.  A 
prob lem consists of the quest ion of whether  a certain proper ty  holds for certain 
entities. For  Hi lbert ,  all p rob lems were solvable because it was not necessary to 
demonstrate  that the proper ty  in quest ion held in order  to view the prob lem as 
solved. Moreover ,  in his view, the proof  that it was impossible for the proper ty  to 
7 A system Yis embedded into another system X, given certain groups A and B of conditions (relations) 
characterizing X and Y, respectively, if it is possible to build a mathematical object satisfying both 
groups of relations A and B. One starts by constructing a mathematical object satisfying A. Then, one 
proceeds by fixing one's attention on further aspects of the object and discovering new properties of 
it. Finally, one compares them with B. If they are compatible to each other, then the construction of
the object satisfying both A and B is performable. Otherwise, it is not. 
An example of this last case is presented by Troelstra [46,196]: a square circle does not exist. "Starting 
with the construction of a square ABCD, then observing that as a circle it should have a centre S, the 
intersection of the diagonals AC and BD, and as a radius r, the length of AS; then observing that the 
middle of AB has a distance l ss than r from S, we see that the square ABCD cannot be seen as a circle." 
8 As for the intuitionist meaning of logical constants, it is useful to recall a clarification which Michael 
Detlefsen made in his paper, "Brouwerian I tuitionism" [25]. He underscored the fact that intuitionistic 
logic only "alludes" to reasonings, to mental experiences: it affirms that a certain construction (reasoning) 
can/cannot be performed, but it does not describe the construction. This also holds in the case of 
complex logical formulae: for instance, we say that "A A B" is true if we possess both a proof of A (a 
construction for A) and a proof of B, but this does not specify what "both" means, that is, what a 
reasoning built from the reasoning of A and the reasoning of B is like. 
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hold already represented a solution to the problem. If one looks at the intuitionistic 
interpretation of the law of excluded middle from this angle and has clear in one's 
mind that it asserts that for every property and for every mathematical entity it 
can be proved either that the property holds or that it is impossible for the property 
to hold, then it is apparent that the law claims the solvability of all mathematical 
problems. At this point, if there exists a mathematical problem which is still open, 
this fact suspends the validity of the law. Brouwer changed his mind about this 
question several times throughout his scientific life. 
In [4, 110], at the very beginning of his reflections, he simply stated that unsolved 
mathematical problems prevent us from asserting that the law holds. As examples, 
he mentioned both the presence of a digit occurring more often than any other 
and the presence of infinitely many pairs of consecutive equal digits in the decimal 
expansion of zr. These examples how that there exist a real number (~r) and some 
properties ("having a digit occurring more often than any other in its decimal 
expansion after the point" and "having infinitely many pairs of consecutive equal 
digits in its decimal expansion after the point") for which the law is not known to 
hold. But he added that the law is nonetheless noncontradictory. By way of proof, 
he pointed to the fact that its contradictoriness (that is, the negation of its assertion) 
would lead to another contradiction, amely, the simultaneous affirmation of the 
simple negation and the negation of the negation of a property. He did not spell 
this out fully; he merely claimed that the law of  excluded middle is noncontradic- 
tory, without explaining that it is not the general law but the law applied to a 
single property which is noncontradictory. Symbolic notation makes the question 
more understandable. The (general) law of excluded middle can be written in a 
second-order language as VPVx(Px  V -~Px). The result of Brouwer's proof is 
V PVx -~ -1 ( Px V -~ Px ) and not -1 -1VPVx(Px V -~ Px ). 
In [7, 276], Brouwer considered matters from a new perspective to show that the 
law of excluded middle does not hold. This time, he did not use the open problem 
of the presence of 0123456789 in the decimal expansion of zr to obtain directly the 
number 1r and the property of "having 0123456789 in its decimal expansion after 
the point" for which the law of excluded middle does not hold. Rather, he used it 
to construct a new number for which the law does not hold, according to whether 
or not 0123456789 appears, considered for each step of the expansion of ~r. He 
started with the question of the presence of the sequence 0123456789 in the decimal 
expansion of zr and called m the first place after the point where 0123456789 begins 
(that is, the place where a 0 followed by the sequence 123456789 is first found). 
He next constructed a real number p as the limit of an infinite convergent sequence 
Cl ,  C 2 . . . . .  where c, = (-1/2) ~, if v < m and c, = (-1/2) m otherwise. To construct 
9, we must check at each step whether at that step 0123456789 starts in the decimal 
expansion of 7r. The number O is a real number, since the sequence q,  c2 .. . .  
converges. We cannot, however, affirm that it is rational because, according to 
intuitionism, we have to know the natural numbers which constitute a ratio in order 
to state that it is a ratio. Therefore, we cannot affirm the law of excluded middle 
where the property P is "to be rational." 
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Five years later, in 1928, Brouwer published the paper "Intuitionistische B trach- 
tungen tiber den Formalismus" [9],9 in which he clarified and stated more precisely 
the question of the principle of excluded middle. He distinguished between three 
kinds of assertions of the law of excluded middle: the simple assertion, that is, 
the general law applied to a single property and to a single mathematical entity 
(P(a) ~/-7 P(a)); a finite number of assertions, that is, a finite conjunction of simple 
assertions; and an infinite number of assertions, that is, the general law itself or 
the general law applied to a single entity (VP(P(a) ~/ -~ P(a)) or the general law 
applied to a single property (Vx(Px ~/ -1Px)). Brouwer specified that the single 
assertion of the law is noncontradictory, offering the same reason as in 1908. This 
is also true of a finite number of assertions of the law, as is proved by induction, 
the basis of which has just been explained. Suppose that n assertions of the law of 
excluded middle are noncontradictory, then n + i assertions must also be noncontra- 
dictory since the contradictoriness of n + i assertions would imply the contradictori- 
ness of a single assertion of excluded middle (the (n + 1)th), which is a contradiction. 
To see this, let P1,/'2 . . . . .  Pn+l be the properties to which the given n + 1 assertions 
of the law refer. If the conjunction of these assertions leads to contradiction, then 
each of the 2 n+l conjunctions ofP1, P2 . . . . .  Pn+l (with or without he sign of negation) 
leads to contradiction. On the other hand, if Pn+l were either true or absurd (i.e., 
if the (n + 1)th assertion of the law held), then, since n assertions are noncontradic- 
tory, both their conjunction with the positive predicate P in the 
(n + 1)st assertion and their conjunction with the negative predicate -~ P in the 
(n + 1)st assertion would be true, contrary to what has just been maintained [9,413]. 
The novelty of the treatment is that an infinite number of assertions of the law, 
9 In this paper, Brouwer listed four essential points for reaching an understanding between the 
formalists and the intuitionists: (1) the distinction between formal theory and metatheory provided with 
an intuitive content and the realization that the latter equires the intuitionistic theory of natural numbers; 
(2) the reflection on the reliability of the law of excluded middle and the admission that its domain of 
validity within intuitive metamathematics ranges only over finite systems; (3) the identification of the 
law of excluded middle with the solvability of all problems; and (4) the acknowledgment that the 
justification of formalist mathematics through a proof of consistency involves a vicious circle, since this 
justification consists in deriving an affirmation from a double negation (that is, from noncontradiction) 
and, hence, already presupposes the law of excluded middle (equivalent to ~ ~A ~ A). Brouwer 
observed that formalists had at least partially accepted the first two points but still rejected the last two. 
He wanted formalists to accept his conditions and was waiting for them to make a definitive step in his 
direction. During the twenties, he had enlarged his influence in Germany: he had lectured many times 
at Berlin, the university directly opposed to a G/Sttingen under Hilbert's reign. Instead, as explained in 
detail in [23], in the same year of 1928, Brouwer experienced a strong reaction by Hilbert: he was 
removed from the editorial board of the Mathematische Annalen under pressure from Hilbert. According 
to van Dalen [23, 31], "Hilbert's attack, the lack of support from old friends, the (real or imagined) 
shame of his dismissal, the cynical ignoring of his undeniable fforts for the Annalen, each and all of 
these factors drove Brouwer to a self-chosen isolation . . . .  He continued to work in the field [of 
intuitionistic mathematics], but on a very limited scale with only a couple of followers. Actually, his 
whole mathematical ctivity became rather marginal for a prolonged period. During the thirties Brouwer 
had hardly published at all (only two small papers on topology): he undertook all kinds of projects that 
had nothing to do with mathematics or its foundations." 
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and hence the law itself, is proved to be contradictory. This is based on the so- 
called "nonsplitting theorem," which states that if the unitary continuum (i.e., the 
interval of the continuum between 0and 1) splits into two disjoint subspecies, then 
one is empty and the other is the unitary continuum itself. In other words, if the 
law of excluded middle holds on the unitary continuum, then every property holds 
either for all or for none of the points of the continuum. This consequence is an 
absurdity, since there are clearly properties which can hold only for some points of 
the continuum (for example, "to be rational"). Therefore, the nonsplitting theorem 
means that the law of excluded middle in its most general form implies an absurdity 
and so is contradictory. 
In [10] Brouwer essentially reiterated the simpler treatment of 1923, except hat 
he used a generic rather than a specific open question. He introduced the so-called 
"fleeing property" which satisfies the following requirements: 
(1) for each natural number n, it can be decided whether or not n possesses 
the property f; 
(2) no way is known to calculate a natural number possessing f; and 
(3) the assumption that at least one natural number possesses f is not known 
to be contradictory. 
This difference implies that the "duration" of the suspension of the validity of the 
law of excluded middle is longer than that in the example of 1923. Even if the 
specific open question of 1923 were solved--and so the entire counterexample w re 
no longer valid--other questions would remain open, and the counterexample of 
1929 would remain valid. However, this is a weak result compared with that of 
1928, and Brouwer presented it along with some classical theorems, which intuition- 
istically do not hold if they refer to the r al numbers of the counterexample of the 
law. Therefore, it seems that Brouwer published this weak counterexample of the 
law not for its intrinsic importance but because it was useful for analyzing the 
difference between classical and intuitionistic mathematics. 
In his Cambridge Lectures of the years 1946-1951 [18], 1° Brouwer econsidered 
the question of the validity of the law of excluded middle, introducing the same 
distinction into three kinds of assertions and expressing the same opinion as to 
their respective validity. He simplified to some extent the explanation of the noncon- 
tradictoriness of finite assertions of the law of excluded middle, saying that if they 
are contradictory, then one of the members of the conjunction (which are each 
single assertions of the law of excluded middle) must itself be contradictory. This 
is a contradiction. In the section where he analyzed the law of excluded middle 
l0 As van Dalen recalls in [18, ix], Brouwer went to Cambridge many times from 1946 to 1951, 
apparently with the aim of preparing a book on intuitionism with the collaboration of Professor W. P. 
Steen and Dr. N. Routledge. Still, both men "had the impression that Brouwer never intended to publish 
the lectures, and that he used the proposed book as a pretext o return to Cambridge where he 
loved to lecture. Nevertheless, Brouwer kept revising his manuscript long after he stopped lecturing in 
Cambridge," although, in effect, he never published it. His manuscripts were collected by Dirk van 
Dalen and appeared in 1981, after Brouwer's death. 
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[18, 10-12], Brouwer did not explicitly mention the nonsplitting theorem as a ground 
for the contradictoriness of the law, but he presented this fact in the section where 
he proved the nonsplitting theorem [18, 87]. Later, he merely reported the fact that 
there are proofs of this contradictoriness, and when he specified what he called 
"refutations" of the law, he simply presented weak counterexamples based on open 
problems [12, 490-491; 14, 524-525; 15, 552-553]. 
4. THE POSSIBLE STATES OF A FORMULA 
As we have just seen, Brouwer interpreted the "nonvalidity" of the law of 
excluded middle in three different ways during his career: prior to 1928, it meant 
that one was unable to maintain that the law holds; later, it meant hat the general 
law was contradictory; and finally, it took on both meanings simultaneously. 
Brouwer also retained the first meaning of "nonvalidity" in his post-1928 papers' 
references to other logical laws and to some classical properties and theorems (see, 
for instance, [10]). 
When the meaning of "nonvalidity" changed in 1928, its initial meaning had, in 
fact, never been expressed explicitly. This problem arose in the so-called "Brouwer- 
ian logic" debate. Here, I will touch on only the points from this debate of major 
import for the question at hand. In [48], Rolin Wavre summed up the differences 
between the positions of intuitionism and formalism and, in so doing, considered 
both the interpretation of the nonvalidity of the law of excluded middle and the 
question of whether a"tertium" can ever be found, that is, whether the indemonstra- 
bility of a mathematical property can ever be proved. In [49, 74], he argued that 
Brouwer had opened up the possibility of a "tertium" but had not provided the 
tertium itself. Paul L6vy stated in 1926 [36, 257-258] that the indemonstrability of 
a mathematical property cannot be proved; at each moment, a mathematical prop- 
erty is (1) either proved to be true, (2) or proved to be false, (3) or not yet proved 
to be true or false. Marcel Barzin and Alfred Errera reconsidered the problem a 
year later [1], interpreting the nonvalidity as a third truth-value and proving that 
it would lead to a contradiction. L6vy [37, 266] countered immediately by presenting 
a distinction between "6nonc6" and "6nonc6 Brouwerien" in order to emphasize 
that "nonvalidity" means a state of expectation of a truth-value, not an already 
found truth-value. Finally, in 1930, Arend Heyting [29, 959] accepted this distinction 
(but specifying that "assertion"--"6nonc6 Brouwerien"--means "effectively 
proved") and proclaimed that the simple "6nonc6" was what Brouwer really had 
in mind. 
Underlying this debate, however, was the more general question of the "possible 
states" of a formula (i.e., of the possible conditions in which a formula can be with 
respect o its provability), which also involved the distinction between an effective 
proof and the mere possession of a method of proof (an algorithm). In 1935, Paul 
Bernays [2, 62] pointed out that the impossibility of listing all methods of proof 
in intuitionism entails the impossibility of defining (and accepting) the universal 
quantifier. He then used the observation that intuitionists make general statements 
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to show that intuitionism did not itself remain faithful to intuition. 11 In Heyting's 
formalization of intuitionistic logic, the method of proof was, however, introduced 
as a meaning for the universal quantifier, 12 although he included it in the list of 
intuitionistic notions (which he presented from 1949 on) about whose evidence 
there was some doubt [30, 306-307; 32, 332-337; 33, 103-104; 34, 195]. 
Brouwer did not take part in any of these debates, owing to the rupture of his 
friendship with David Hilbert. Still, Brouwer did present the above-mentioned 
aspects of the question of the possible states of a formula later, in 1955 [15, 552], 
although he did not allude to their original contexts. He simply stated that one of 
the following cases applies to a mathematical "assertion": "1) it can be true; 2) it 
can be absurd; 3) it cannot yet be proved to be either false or true, but an algorithm 
is known leading to the decision either that the formula is true or that it is absurd; 
or 4) it cannot yet be proved to be either false or true, nor do we know an algorithm 
leading to the decision either that the formula is true or that it is absurd" [15,552]. 
The contraposition between the first and the last two cases echoes the difference 
between true/absurd, on the one hand, and not-yet-proved, onthe other, the former 
expressing a state of knowledge and the latter a lack thereof. However, he did not 
use the words "assertion" and "proposition" to characterize the difference: the 
word "assertion" simply meant "formula," since he probably wanted to avoid the 
latter term given his dislike of symbolism. The fourth case also suggests the distinc- 
tion between effective proof and method of proof. It is worthwhile to recall here 
that in notes taken during a conference in 1951, Brouwer wrote about 3) above that: 
The case that c~ has neither been proved to be true nor to be absurd, but that we know a finite 
algorithm leading to the statement either that c~ is true, or that c~ is absurd, obviously is reducible 
to the first and second cases. This applies in particular to assertion of possibility of a construction 
of bounded finite character in a finite mathematical system, because such a construction can 
be attempted only in a finite number of particular ways, and each attempt proves successful 
or abortive in a finite number of steps. [18, 92] 
The same expression can be found in the manuscript [20, 454], which is a different 
version of the notes. However, all these notes were published posthumously, and 
Brouwer viewed the version of 1955 as his definitive opinion on the subject. 
5. SOME OTHER LOGICAL LAWS 
Brouwer's further contribution to the description of the domain of validity of 
the law of excluded middle was a consideration of the two laws which are classically 
11 In his article, Bernays distinguished between three positions: extreme Platonism, balanced Platonism 
(which he shared), and intuitionism. According to the first, all is independent of the subject. The last 
holds that all depends on the subject (knowledge is based on subjective vidence). The middle position, 
however, takes knowledge as starting with subjective vidence but then abstracting from it (and also 
accepting, by analogy, constructions that the subject cannot perform). Intuitionism, despite its original 
proposals, goes beyond pure evidence because it accepts the constructability of any natural number 
and the notion of universal statements. 
12 In 1956 [31, 228], Heyting defined the universal quantifier as follows: "'Vxp(x) can be asserted if 
and only if we have a general method of construction which, assuming that x ranges over the species 
Q, whatever element a of Q is chosen, yields by way of specialisation the construction p(a) ."  For a 
history of the development of the definition of logical constants in Heyting's work, see [26, 154-162]. 
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equivalent to it, namely, what he called the "law of reciprocity of complementarity" 
(VPVx(~ ~Px  ~ Px)) and the "law of testability" (VPVx(~Px  k/ ~ ~Px)) .  He 
made his first observations on this topic in [7], but considered them in detail only 
once [9]. In [9], he proved, and only for the first of these laws, the contradictoriness 
of its general expression. On every other occasion, he just showed the suspension 
of their validity. 
As for the law of reciprocity of complementarity, Brouwer used the xample 
quoted above in ]7, 276-277]: even if we can affirm that it is impossible for the 
number p to be irrational (=nonrational), since it is, however, a rational number 
raised to a natural number, we cannot state that it is rational because we do not 
know what it is exactly. He then emphasized that both the inverse of the law of 
reciprocity of complementarity (A ~ -1 ~A)  and the specialization of the law to 
a negative property (--1-~-~A ~ ~A)  hold. He considered the first statement 
obvious and proved the second by inferring -1-1 ~A ~ -~A directly from 
A ~ -1 ~A. He noted also that -1A ~ -1 -1 -~A holds as the particular case of 
A ~ -1 --1A in which A is a negative property. Thus, -1A is equivalent to -1 -1 -1 A, 
while A is not equivalent to --1 -1A. 
The nonvalidity of the law of reciprocity of complementarity no longer allowed 
the use of the method of proof by reductio ad absurdum [7, 276-277]. The proof 
of A thus starts by negating A, then shows that A implies a contradiction (i.e., that 
-1A holds) and finally deduces A by means of the law -1 -7 A ~ A. It was this 
last step that was no longer valid. Moreover, the nonvalidity of the law of reciprocity 
of complementarity caused the doubling of most mathematical properties into 
themselves and their double negation: only in a few cases (for example, the equality 
between real numbers) did they and their double negation remain intuitionistically 
equivalent. On the other hand, the validity of the law of reciprocity of complementar- 
ity with respect to negative properties ( --1 -1 ~ A ~ -1 A) specified that this splitting 
could not continue (that is, a property could not split into itself, its double negation, 
the double negation of its double negation, and so on). 13 
As for the law of testability, Brouwer took the following as a property P: there 
"exists a number kl such that the sequence 0123456789 begins for the first time at 
the kl-th step of the decimal expansion of ~r" [7, 276-277]. He noted that for this 
P, -1P k/ ~ ~ P does not hold. 
In [9, 414], besides the law of excluded middle, Brouwer analyzed only the law 
of reciprocity of contradictoriness, considering its three possible kinds (referring 
to a single property, to a finite number of properties, and to an infinite number of 
properties) and showed the contradictoriness of the general case. He used the 
"species" G (i.e., the "set" G in intuitionist erminology) of the points x of the 
unitary continuum C for which it is decidable whether or not x is rational. The 
complementary species of the complementary species of G in C is identical to C, 
13 The proof by reductio ad absurdum is intuitionistically valid for proving -~A. Namely, in order to 
prove -~A, one starts with A, then shows that -1 -~A implies a contradiction (i.e., that -~ -~ -~A holds) 
and finally deduces ~Aby means of the law ~ ~ -hA ~ -~A. 
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since the complementary species of G in C is empty. (It corresponds to a contradic- 
tory property.) After all, the complementary species of the complementary species 
of G is the set of points x in C in which R(x)  k~ -~R(x) is absurd (it is the set of 
the points x that do not belong to G, i.e., the points for which the decidability of 
their rationality is absurd), where "R" means "to be rational." This absurdity is 
equivalent to -~R(x) /k -1 -~R(x), a contradiction. However, G cannot itself be 
identical to C, for, according to the nonsplitting theorem, if it were, either all or 
none of the points of the unitary continuum would be rational. 
In [12] and [14], Brouwer gave different more refined proofs of the nonvalidity 
of these laws, and he also showed that the field of validity of the law of excluded 
middle is equivalent to the intersection ofthe fields of validity of the law of testability 
and of the law of reciprocity of contradictoriness. This means that the law of 
excluded middle holds only for the properties for which both the other laws hold. 
This may be why Brouwer called these laws "corollaries" of the law of excluded 
middle. He also showed that neither the law of testability nor the law of reciprocity 
of complementarity always holds for the same properties. 
The papers of both 1948 and 1954 involve very similar treatments which differ 
only in detail. In contrast, hey contain deep differences with respect o the analysis 
given in the 1923 paper: (1) the former do not refer to a specific open mathematical 
problem (such as the presence of 0123456789 in the decimal expansion of r 0 but 
rather to a generic open mathematical problem; (2) they treat an assertion for 
which we have neither aproof of its contradictoriness nor a proof of its noncontradic- 
toriness (while in 1923 the problem was viewed in "positive" terms, since we did 
not know whether or not 0123456789 was present in the decimal expansion of 70; 
and (3) their construction is built according to the state of knowledge of the "creative 
subject" about the given assertion at each step of the construction (and not, as in 
the 1923 paper, according to the mere fact that we lack information about a certain 
question like the presence of 0123456789 in the decimal expansion of ~r). 
Brouwer presented the following examples in both the 1948 and 1954 papers: 
(1) a case in which none of the three laws holds, (2) a case in which only the law 
of testability holds, (3) a case in which the law of testability holds while the law 
of excluded middle does not, and (4) a case in which the law of reciprocity of 
complementarity holds, while the law of excluded middle does not. 
The proof of the first example of 1948 differs from that of 1954. In [12, 491- 
492], Brouwer took P to be the property "to be rational" and let x vary on the 
continuum. His assertion a had the property that "the creative subject has not 
experienced either its absurdity or the absurdity of its absurdity"; c(y) was an 
irrational number, the limit of the infinite convergent sequence cl(y), c2(y) . . . . .  
This sequence was the union 14 of (1) a fundamental sequence (i.e., a lawlike infinite 
convergent sequence) of rational numbers dl(y), de(y), . . . .  "apart" from each 
14 This means that the sequence a(y), C2(~/) . . . .  is formed by the sequence dffy), d2(y)  . . . . .  and by 
the sequence 11(7), 12(y) ..... 
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other 15 and such that d~(T) °> c(y)  16 and (2) a fundamental sequence of irrational 
numbers ll(y), /2(Y) . . . .  apart from each other and such that/~(y) <o c(y)" The 
"creative subject" had to build an infinite convergent sequence COl(T, oz), tO2(T, or), 
• . . by letting cO,(T, a)  = c(y) for each natural number v whenever, during the 
choice of toy(T, or), neither the truth nor the absurdity of a was experienced; by 
taking COr+v(T, or) = Or(T, Or) = dr(T) for each natural number v whenever, between 
the choice of oJr-a(y, a)  and that of o~r(y, a), the truth of a was experienced; by 
setting tOs+~(y, a)  = tOs(y, a) = ls(y) for each natural number v whenever, between 
the choice of tos-l(y, a)  and that of C0s(y, a), the absurdity of a was experienced• 
The infinite convergent sequence O~l(y, a),  oJ2(y, a)  . . . .  tended to the real number 
E(T, a), and thus the three laws no longer held if they referred to its rationality• 
In other words, we do not know what E(% a) is like, and we can neither prove 
nor disprove its rationality• Moreover, we can neither prove nor disprove the 
contradictoriness of its rationality and, even if we were sure of its nonirrationality, 
we could not affirm its rationality• The latter can be done only if the creative subject 
has experienced the truth of or, and this fact is not a consequence of the information 
that leads to the nonirrationality of the number. 17 
In [14, 525], Brouwer simplified his argument• He again took P as the property 
"to be rational"; a was an assertion such that "the creative subject has not experi- 
enced either its absurdity or the absurdity of its absurdity"; but c(y), an irrational 
number, was the limit of a fundamental sequence of rational numbers Ca(y), c2(y), 
• . .  apart from each other and such that c~(y) °> c(y) for all v. The creative sub- 
ject built the infinite convergent sequence cl(y, a), c2(y, a)  . . . .  by choosing 
c,(y, a)  = c(y ) for each natural number v whenever, during the choice of c~(y, a),  the 
truth of a was not experienced; and by letting Cr+~(y, a) = Cr(T, Or) = Cr(T) for each 
natural number v whenever, between the choice of Cr-~(y, a) and that of Cr(y, a), 
the truth of a had been experienced• In this case, the truth of a and the rationality 
of the limit C(T, a) of the sequence cl(y, a), c2(y, a) . . . .  were equivalent; herefore 
the validity of both the law of excluded middle and the law of testability was 
suspended if they referred to the rationality of this number• Furthermore, since the 
non-contradictoriness of a did not imply its truth, the non-contradictoriness of the 
rationality of C(T, a)  did not imply its rationality, and, hence, the law of reciprocity 
of contradictoriness did not hold if it referred to the rationality of this number. 
As for the second example, this was the same in both the paper of 1948 [12, 
491-492] and that of 1954 [14, 525], and it was very similar to the one sketched in 
the previous paragraph• T e only difference lay in the construction of the number 
D(T, a)  analogous to C(T, a). This time, the creating subject chose c~(7, a) = c(y) 
for each natural number v whenever, during the choice of c~(y, or), neither the truth 
15 A number a is said to lie "apart" from b (a#b) if there is some natural number n such that 
tb - a] > 2 n. 
16 A number b is said to be measurably larger than a number a (b °> a) if there is some natural 
number n such that b - a > 2 -n. 
17 It must be emphasized that Brouwer did not specify in 1948 that c(y) is irrational, but he did so 
in all the examples of 1954. I have made this specific here, for otherwise the proofs are incomprehensible. 
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nor the absurdity of o~ had been experienced; and Cr+v('y , Ol) = Cr('~, Ol) = Cr('y ) for 
each natural number v whenever, between the choice of Cr-l(y, o~) and that of Cr(% 
o~), either the truth or the absurdity of o~ had been experienced. The limit D(% c~) 
of the sequence so constructed could not be irrational, since it could be irrational 
only if the first situation (lack of knowledge about the truth or the absurdity of o~) 
held forever. However, this would mean that the creative subject never experiences 
either the truth or the absurdity of o~, and this proves the absurdity of both the 
truth and the absurdity of oz, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have a proof 
of the nonirrationality of D(% c~). Consequently, the example does not "touch" 
the validity of the law of testability, applied to this number and to the property P 
"to be rational." Still, we cannot affirm the rationality of D(y, oe) since we do not 
exactly know what the number is like. Hence, the example causes the nonvalidity 
of both the other laws. 
Regarding the third example, Brouwer gave, both in [12, 492] and in [14, 526], 
the species C of the real numbers D(% c~1), D(y, o~2) . . . .  constructed as in the 
previous example, but each with respect o a different assertion off n with the same 
characteristic as ~ above. Taking P again to be the property "to be rational" and 
letting x range over the species A = B U C, where B is a species of irrational 
numbers and C is the species given above (whose members are not irrational), then 
this does not touch the validity of the law of testability. It does, however, cause the 
nonvalidity of the law of excluded middle, since we are not able to prove the 
rationality of the members of C. (This also causes the nonvalidity of the law of 
reciprocity of complementarity, as in the example above, but Brouwer did not point 
this out.) On the other hand, taking P to be the property (or, more precisely, the 
relation) "to be equal" and letting the numbers in question vary on the species A 
above, then this does not touch the law of reciprocity of complementarity, because 
the relation of equality is stable (i.e., it is equivalent to its double negation). Yet 
we cannot say, for each pair of members of A, whether or not they are equal, 
because we do not know what each member of C is like. (This also causes the 
nonvalidity of the law of testability, which Brouwer did not point out.) 
All these constructions present a common difficulty due to the introduction of 
the "creating subject." Namely, does the construction have to be built with respect 
to a general state of knowledge about he given assertion (i.e., with respect o what 
is known about it in mathematics) or with respect o personal knowledge about it? 
Since, in both meanings, the constructions are possible and since only this is relevant 
for the present purpose, I will not go into this question any further. 
It may be that Brouwer had this problem in mind when, in his paper of 1955, he 
presented two examples in which the law of excluded middle did not hold while 
the law of reciprocity of contradictoriness and the law of testability did. In both of 
these examples, he used a real number which is constructed in almost the same 
way as in 1923 (but differently from that in 1948 [12] and 1954 [14]). The only real 
difference lay in the absence of a reference to a specific open problem; he chose 
any (unspecified) open problem. Brouwer eintroduced [15,553] the fleeing property 
and defined the number s through the infinite convergent sequence al, a2 . . . . .  
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where av = ( -2 )  -~, if no natural number  k -< v possesses the property f, and a~ = 
( -2 )  -~, if some natural number  k - v possesses f. The sequence is convergent since, 
beyond a ,  its field of variation is <a,  = 2 -~+1. 
If we consider the assertion "s = 0," we see that it satisfies the law of reciprocity 
of absurdity for, "if some day a proof  of its noncontradictority ]sic] will be given, 
its truth will be established simultaneously" [15, 553]. Since, on the one hand, three 
negations are equivalent to a single negation and, on the other, the noncontradictori-  
ness of this law is equivalent to the fact that "it is contradictory that it is contradictory 
that no number  k possesses f," the noncontradictoriness of this law is equivalent 
to the fact that no number  k possesses f, which in turn is itself equivalent o s = 
0. However,  s = 0 does not satisfy the principle of the excluded middle, since we 
do not know s exactly. 
If we consider the assertion "s is rational," we see that it is noncontradictory 
without being either true or false. Therefore, it satisfies the law of testability (since 
one of its members is true) but not the law of excluded middle [15, 553]. 
In the same paper, Brouwer considered De Morgan's system and indicated which 
part of it still held from the intuitionistic point of view. These reflections resulted 
from his considerations of the nonvalidity of the law of reciprocity of contradictori- 
ness. Brouwer then analyzed the following four equivalences in De Morgan's ystem 
[15, 553-554]: 
(1) ~(s  V t) -= ~s  A ~t, 
(2) -7 ( - l sV  ~t )~sAt ,  
(3) sVt= -~( '~sA - l t ) ,and  
(4) - l (s A t) =- (--is V ~t) .  
Classically, the last three laws can be derived from the first. Intuitionistically, on 
the contrary, they do not hold, although the first is true. Brouwer gave only the 
examples which showed that these laws do not continue to hold. For the second 
and the third, it sufficed to consider the case in which s and t coincided. Under  this 
assumption, (2) meant ~ ( -~ s V -~ s) =- s A s, an expression equivalent o s A s ~- 
-7 -~s A -7 -~s, which implied -7 -~s - s; and (3) meant s V s - -~ (-~s A ~s) ,  an 
expression equivalent o s V s =- -1 --1 s V -1 -~ s, which implied s --- --1 -1 s. As we 
have seen, -1 -1 s ~ s can no longer hold intuitionistically. As for (4), Brouwer used 
the fact that it is possible to build a real number  r such that it is different from 0, 
but it is not known to be either >0 or <0, so neither is it known to be ->0 or -<0. 
Nevertheless, his reasoning is not completely comprehensible. He started by letting 
s be the assertion "r  -> 0" and t the assertion "r  -< 0." Then s A t is equivalent o 
r -> 0 A r -< 0, which means r = 0. Consequently, --1 (s A t) is equivalent o r # 0, 
and it is true, because r # 0 is true by hypothesis. It is the next step which is 
questionable: Brouwer  maintained that -1 s V -1 t was equivalent o "either r -> 0 
or r -< 0," which did not hold and therefore did not allow equivalence (4) to hold. 
But -1 s V ~ t is equivalent o -1 r -> 0 V ~ r -< 0. The correct description of the 
reasoning is that -1 s V -~ t is equivalent o -7 r -> 0 V r -< 0, which, in turn, is 
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equivalent o "r < 0 V r > 0." This does not hold and therefore does not allow 
(4) to hold. 
It was in this paper that Brouwer showed some interest in formal logic. As we 
have seen, he had initially expressed a certain aversion to logic, although there 
was, in principle, some place for the reflection on logic in his theoretical system. 
In effect, he repeatedly occupied himself with the question of the validity of the 
law of excluded middle and the laws classically equivalent o it. In summarizing 
intuitionism in 1952, Brouwer explained the meaning of this question within the 
general intuitionistic framework: 
• . . mathematical language by itself can never create new mathematical systems. But on 
account of the highly logical character of usual mathematical l nguage the following question 
presents itself: 
Suppose that an intuitionist mathematical construction has been carefully described by means 
of words, and then, the introspective character of the mathematical construction being ignored 
for a moment, its linguistic description is considered by itself and submitted to a linguistic 
application of a principle of classical logic. Is it then always possible to perform a languageless 
mathematical construction finding its expression in the logico-linguistic figure in question? 
[13, 510] TM
In Brouwer's theoretical system there was place not only for reflecting on logic, 
but also for appreciating it as something pure, not applied, cultivated for its sake. 
Only in the last paper of his life did he show that he had realized this fact. It may 
have been Heyting's clear and simple intuitionistic system of logic 19 that allowed 
Brouwer to recognize the "beauty" of logic and to find within the intuitionistic 
framework the "permission" to appreciate it and to study it in greater depth. 
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